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Abstract—In this paper, a salary-plus-bonus incentive mecha-
nism is proposed to motivate WiFi Access Points (APs) to provide
data offloading service for mobile network operators (MNOs).
Under the proposed salary-plus-bonus scheme, WiFi APs are
rewarded not only based on offloaded data volume but also
based on the quality of their offloading service. The interactions
between WiFi APs and the MNO under this incentive mechanism
are then studied using Stackelberg game. By differentiating
whether WiFi APs are of the same type (e.g. offloading cost and
quality), two cases (homogeneous and heterogeneous) are studied.
For both cases, we derive the best response functions for WiFi
APs (i.e. the optimal amount of data to offload), and show that
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists for the subgame. Then,
given WiFi APs’ strategies, we investigate the optimal strategy
(i.e. the optimal salary and bonus) for the MNO to maximize
its utility. Then, two simple incentive mechanisms, referred to as
the salary-only scheme and the bonus-only scheme, are presented
and studied using Stackelberg game. For both of them, it is
shown that the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) exists and is unique.
We also show that the salary-only scheme is more effective in
offloading more data, and the bonus-only scheme is more effective
in selecting premium APs (i.e. providing high-quality offloading
service at low cost), while the salary-plus-bonus scheme can
strike a well balance between the offloaded data volume and
the offloading quality.
Index Terms—Data Offloading; WiFi Offloading; Heteroge-
neous Networks; Incentive Mechanisms; Game Theory; Stack-
elberg Game; Optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
With the rapid development of smart phones and mobile
broadband services, data usage over the cellular network in-
creases dramatically recently [2]. The unprecedented explosion
of mobile data traffic poses new challenges to the current
cellular networks. For example, in crowed areas such as metro
areas and during peak hours, most 4G networks are overloaded
[3]. The quality of experience in these overloaded areas is
therefore affected, e.g., low data transmission rate, access to
some mobile applications, etc. Upgrading the cellular network
to the more advanced 5G network [4] or deploying more base
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stations with smaller cell size [5] may be a viable solution for
the aforementioned problem. However, these approaches may
incur increase in infrastructure cost.
From the mobile operator’s perspective, a more cost-
effective approach is to offload some of the mobile traffic to
existing WiFi networks, which is often referred to as WiFi
offloading. WiFi offloading is also a practical and readily
available solution for a few reasons: (i) most of the mobile data
services are created by smart phones which already have built-
in WiFi modules, and (ii) WiFi’s high data transmission rate.
IEEE 802.11n WiFi can deliver data rates as high as 600Mbps
and IEEE 802.11ac can deliver up to 6.933Gbps [6], which
is much faster than 4G. Recent research papers [7]–[11] also
demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WiFi offload-
ing in relieving the data traffic burden of cellular networks. In
[7], the feasibility of augmenting 3G using WiFi was studied.
In [8], performance of data offloading through WiFi networks
for metropolitan areas was investigated. The numbers of WiFi
APs needed for data offloading in large metropolitan areas was
studied in [9].The load-balancing and user-association problem
for offloading in heterogeneous networks were investigated in
[10]. In [11], the authors investigated data offloading schemes
for load coupled networks, and showed that the optimal
loading is tractable when proportional fairness is considered.
Though WiFi offloading is a promising technology and has
many advantages, without economic incentives, WiFi APs may
be reluctant to provide data offloading service for the MNO.
This is because providing offloading service for the MNO
will inevitably incur additional operation cost, such as energy
cost, data-usage cost. Besides, when providing data service
for guest users from the cellular network, WiFi APs may
have to sacrifice its own users’ benefit, such as bandwidth,
transmission rate, and quality of service. Therefore, there is a
compelling need to design effective incentive mechanisms to
motivate WiFi APs to participate in WiFi offloading.
B. Related Work
Incentive mechanisms to motivate WiFi APs to providing
data offloading services or to motivate mobile users to offload
data to WiFi APs have been studied in [12]– [18]. In [12],
the authors proposed the so-called market-based data offload-
ing where the MNO pays WiFi APs for offloading traffic.
An offloading game between the MNO and WiFi APs was
formulated to study the pricing strategy of the MNO. In [13],
the authors considered a one-to-many bargaining game among
2the MNO and APs, and analyzed the bargaining solution
under the sequential bargaining and the concurrent bargaining,
respectively. In [14], a three-stage game was formulated to
study the data offloading with price-taking and price-setting
APs. In [15], the authors investigated optimal user association
strategies for a HetNet where the MNO pays third-party WiFi
APs for providing data offloading service. However, in [12]–
[15], the MNO pays WiFi APs only based on the offloaded
data volume, while the quality of data offloading service was
considered in the incentive mechanism.
In [16], the authors focused on the interactions between
the MNO and mobile users. The MNO rewards mobile users
if they direct their delay-tolerant data service to WiFi APs.
The economic benefits brought to the MNO and users due
to the delayed WiFi offloading were then studied. In [17],
the authors investigated the tradeoff between the amount of
traffic being offloaded and the users’ satisfaction. An incentive
framework to motivate users to leverage their delay tolerance
for cellular traffic offloading was proposed. In [18], the authors
studied the load-balancing problem for data offloading, and
designed a quality-price contract to motivate users to make
proper association strategy. However, the proposed incentive
mechanisms in [16]–[18] are aimed at providing incentives for
mobile users rather than WiFi APs.
There are also works [19]–[23] investigating mobile data
offloading from other perspectives. In [19], the authors studied
optimal scheduling for incentivizing WiFi offloading under
the energy constraint. A secrecy-based energy-efficient data
offloading with dual connectivity was studied in [20]. In
[21], an energy-aware data offloading scheme via device-to-
device cooperations was proposed. In [22], the authors showed
that WiFi data offloading achieves better performance than
resource sharing when the number of WiFi users is below a
threshold. In [23], a reverse data offloading scheme to offload
WiFi data to LTE-U (LTE in unlicensed band) was studied.
C. Main Contribution
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous network with a
MNO and multiple third-parry WiFi APs. Each WiFi has its
home users (HUs) to serve, and it also has certain leftover
bandwidth for providing data offloading service for the MNO.
We design incentive mechanisms to motivate these WiFi APs
to provide data offloading for the MNO. The main contribution
is summarized as follows.
• We propose a salary-plus-bonus reward scheme as an
incentive to motivate WiFi APs for providing data of-
floading service for the MNO. Particularly, the proposed
incentive mechanism rewards WiFi APs not only based
on the amount of data offloaded but also the quality of
their offloading service.
• Under the proposed salary-plus-bonus scheme, we in-
vestigate the interactions between the MNO and WiFi
APs using Stackelberg game. We derive the best response
functions for WiFi APs which lead to the subgame Nash
Equilibrium (NE). We also investigate the optimal bonus
and salary rate that the MNO should set in order to
maximize its utility.
• We study the formulated Stackelberg game under two
different scenarios: Homogeneous APs and Heteroge-
neous APs. For the Homogeneous case, all WiFi APs are
assumed to be the same type (e.g. offloading quality and
offloading cost). Both the subgame NE and the MNO’s
optimal strategy are obtained in closed-form solutions.
For the heterogeneous case, the subgame NE is obtained
in closed-form for the two-AP case. For the multi-AP
case, we show that the subgame NE can be found by the
simplicial method, and the MNO’s optimal strategy can
be found by a two-dimension grid search.
• For the purpose of comparison, we also investigate two
simplified versions of the salary-plus-bonus scheme: the
salary-only scheme and the bonus-only scheme. For both
schemes, we develop high-efficiency and low-complexity
algorithms to find the optimal strategy for both WiFi APs
and the MNO. It is shown that the salary-only scheme is
more effective in motivating more APs to offload more
data, while the bonus-only scheme is more effective in
selecting premium APs which can provide high-quality
offloading service at low cost.
• We investigate the performance of the aforementioned
incentive mechanisms by numerical simulations. To
study the performance of the proposed salary-plus-
bonus scheme for heterogeneous networks with large-
size, we develop a low-complexity suboptimal algorithm
to quickly find the strategy of APs’ and the MNO. It is
shown that the proposed salary-plus-bonus scheme can
strike a good balance between the offloading quality and
offloaded data volume.
D. Organization of this Paper
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.
Section II presents the system model and the Stackelberg game
formulation for the proposed salary-plus-bonus scheme. In
Section III and IV, we study the optimal offloading strategy of
WiFi APs and the optimal strategy of the MNO for the homo-
geneous and the heterogeneous case, respectively. In Section
V an VI, we present the Stackelberg game formulations for the
salary-only and the bonus-only scheme, respectively. We also
derive the Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e.,the optimal solutons
for APs and the MNO) for the two cases, respectively. In
Section VII, the numerical results are presented to compare
the performance of the three proposed incentive mechanisms.
Especially, we develop a suboptimal algorithm for the salary-
plus-bonus scheme to efficiently find the strategy of APs and
the MNO for heterogeneous networks with large size. Finally,
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
A Stackelberg game [5], [24] is a strategic game that
consists of a leader and several followers competing with
each other on certain resources. The leader moves first and
the followers move subsequently. In this paper, as shown in
Fig. 1, we consider a heterogeneous network with a MNO
and multiple WiFi APs. The set of WiFi APs is denoted by
N . All the WiFi APs can provide data offloading service for
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Fig. 1. Data offloading in HetNet with third-party WiFi APs
the MNO. In particular, we consider the case that each WiFi
AP may have its home users (HUs) and thus it should reserve
certain bandwidth for its HUs. In this paper, like the existing
work [12]– [17], we investigate the data offloading problem
and design incentive mechanism purely from the data level.
Thus, the related physical layer and MAC layer issues to
implement the data offloading schemes are out of concern
of this paper. In this paper, we formulate the MNO as the
leader, and the WiFi APs as the followers. The MNO (leader)
announces a salary and a bonus to the WiFi APs. Then, each
WiFi AP (follower) determines its optimal amount of data
(that it intends to offload) to maximize its utility based on the
salary and the bonus. Thus, the Stackelberg Game consists
of two parts: the game at the WiFi APs and the game at the
MNO, which are introduced in the following two subsections,
respectively.
A. The Game at WiFi APs
Let p denote the pay rate, i.e., cash paid to a WiFi AP
on per unit of data offloaded. Let B denote the total amount
of bonus paid to all WiFi APs for data offloading. Then, the
utility function of an arbitrary WiFi AP can be modelled as
UFi (d, p, B) = Si(p, di) + Bi(B,w,d)− Ci(di), (1)
where d , [d1, · · · , dN ]T with entry di denoting the
amount of data that APi offloads for the MNO, and w ,
[w1, · · · , wN ]T with entry wi denoting the quality of offload-
ing service provided by APi.
It is observed from (1) that each AP’s utility function
consists of three parts: Si(p, di), Bi(B,w,d), and Ci(di).
In the following, we present how to model them under the
proposed incentive mechanism.
Salary: Si(p, di) denotes the salary of APi, i.e. the payment
received for providing data offloading service for the MNO.
Si(p, di) is a function of di and p. Intuitively, the more work
you have done, the more payment you should receive. Thus,
Si(p, di) should be an increasing function of di. Besides,
Si(p, di) also should be an increasing function of p, since
the higher the pay rate is, the more payment you will receive.
In this paper, for simplicity, we use a linear function to model
the salary, which is given as
Si(p, di) = pdi. (2)
Bonus: Bi(B,w,d) denotes the bonus paid to APi by
the MNO. In game theory literature, there are many bonus
distribution models, such as equal share, Shapley value [25],
marginal contribution. In this work, to better stimulate WiFi
APs’ to participate in data offloading, we use the weighted
proportional share model, which is
Bi(B,w,d) =
widi∑
j∈N wjdj
B. (3)
It is observed from (1) that APi’s bonus Bi not only depends
on its own performance (quality of offloading service wi and
amount of data offloaded di) but also depends on other AP’s
performance (w−i and d−i). This is analogous to the bonus
system in human’s society, where a staff’s bonus not only
depends on his/her own performance but also depends on other
staffs’ performance.
Cost: Ci(di) denotes the cost incurred when APi provides
data offloading service for the MNO. Usually, when a WiFi AP
provides data service for more users, it will incur more cost,
such as electricity cost, data usage cost, and etc. In general,
the cost increases with the increasing of the amount of data
offloaded. Thus, in this work, we model the cost as
Ci(di) = cidi, (4)
where ci is a positive constant that relates the amount of data
offloaded to the cost of APi.
Under the Stackelberg game formulation, the amount of data
that APi intends to offload depends on the pay rate p and the
bonus B. In general, if the MNO sets a high p and a high B,
APi is willing to offload more data, and vice versa. Thus, each
WiFi AP has to determine its optimal d∗i given p, B and other
APs’ offloading amount. Mathematically, the problem can be
written as
Problem 1:
max
di≥0
pdi +
widi∑
j∈N wjdj
B − cidi, (5)
s.t. di ≤ Ti, (6)
where Ti , T
C
i − T
H
i . T
C
i is the maximum amount of data
can be admitted within the APi’s capacity and T
H
i is the data
quota reserved for its HUs. Thus, the constraint (38) represents
the maximum amount of data that a WiFi AP can offload.
B. The Game at the MNO
In this subsection, we define the MNO’s utility and present
the game at the MNO. Without loss of generality, in this paper,
we define the MNO’s utility function as
UL(p,B,d) , RL(p,B,d)− CL(p,B,d), (7)
4where RL(p,B,d) is the payoff/benefit gained from of-
floading data, CL(p,B,d) is the cost incurred due to data
offloading.
Note that the MNO’s utility function consists of two parts:
payoff and cost. Both of them are functions of p, B, and d.
In the following, we present how to model them under the
proposed incentive mechanism.
Payoff: The MNO’s payoff is the benefit or reward gained
from offloading data. In this paper, we model the MNO’s
payoff as
RL(p,B,d) = λf(d), (8)
where f(d) is the offloading gain for the MNO, and λ
is a positive constant known as offloading gain coefficient
converting the offloading gain into monetary reward. In this
paper, we use a log function to model the offloading gain, i.e.,
f(d) , log2
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
di
)
. (9)
Though other functions (such as linear functions or exponen-
tial functions) can also be used to model the offloading gain,
log functions are shown in literatures to be more suitable to
representing the relationship between the network performance
and a large class of elastic data traffics [26]. It is observed
from (9) that when the amount of data offloaded is zero
(
∑
i∈N di = 0), the offloading gain f is zero. Besides, the
offloading gain increases with the increasing of the amount of
data offloaded. These indicate that (9) is able to capture the
relationship between the MNO’s benefit and the data offloaded.
Cost: The MNO’s cost includes two parts: the salary and
the bonus. With a unified pay rate p, the total salary paid to
WiFi APs is p
∑
i∈N di. We assume that the bonus that the
MNO intends to hand out is B. Thus, the cost function of the
MNO can be modelled as
CL(p,B,d) = p
∑
i∈N
di +B. (10)
As pointed out in the previous subsection, the amount of
data that each AP intends to offload depends on the pay rate
p and the bonus B. Thus, the MNO can easily control the
total amount of data offloaded to WiFi APs by controlling
p and B. However, the benefit of the MNO received from
data offloading also depends on p and B. Setting high pay
rate and high bonus can help the MNO offload more data,
however, this also increases the operating cost of the MNO.
Therefore, the MNO needs to find the optimal p∗ and B∗ in
order to maximize its utility. Mathematically, the problem can
be written as
Problem 2:
max
p, B
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
di(p,B)
)
− p
∑
i∈N
di(p,B)−B, (11)
s.t. p ≥ 0, B ≥ 0. (12)
C. Stackelberg Equilibrium and Subgame Nash Equilibrium
Problem 1 and Problem 2 together form a Stackelberg game.
The objective of this game is to find the Stackelberg Equilib-
rium (SE) point(s) from which neither the MNO (leader) nor
the WiFi APs (followers) have incentives to deviate. For the
proposed Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium): Let d∗i be the so-
lution for Problem 1 and (p∗, B∗) be the solution for Problem
2. Then, the point (d∗, p∗, B∗) is a SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game if for any (d, p, B), the following conditions
are satisfied:
UL(p∗, B∗,d∗) ≥ UL(p,B,d∗), (13)
UFi (d
∗
i , p
∗, B∗) ≥ UFi (di, p
∗, B∗), ∀i. (14)
where UL and UFi are the utilities of the MNO and the WiFi
APi, respectively.
In the proposed game, it is not difficult to see that WiFi
APs strictly compete in a non-cooperative fashion. Therefore,
a non-cooperative subgame is formulated at WiFi APs’ side.
For a non-cooperative game, NE is defined as the operating
point(s) at which no player can improve utility by changing its
strategy unilaterally, assuming everyone else continues to use
its current strategy. Mathematically, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium): Let (d∗i ,d
∗
−i) be the so-
lution for Problem 1. Then, the point (d∗i ,d
∗
−i) is a NE for the
non-cooperative subgame if for any (di,d
∗
−i), the following
conditions are satisfied:
UFi (d
∗
i ,d
∗
−i) ≥ U
F
i (di,d
∗
−i), ∀i. (15)
For the Stackelberg game formulated here, the SE can be
obtained by finding its subgame NE first. Then, given the
subgame NE, the best response of the MNO can be readily
obtained by solving Problem 2. In the following section, we
investigate the optimal solution and analyze the equilibrium
for the formulated data offloading game.
III. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR HETEROGENEOUS APS
To find the SE, the optimal strategies for the followers
(WiFi APs) must be obtained first, and then the leader (MNO)
derives its optimal strategy on those of the followers. This is
also known as backward induction in game-theoretic studies
[5], [24]. Using this method, the optimal strategies for the
formulated game are derived in the following two subsections.
A. Optimal Strategies of WiFi APs
To find the optimal strategies of WiFi APs, we first look at
the best response of each WiFi AP given p, B and other APs’
strategies, which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The best response function of APi is
d∗i =


0, if ai > 0 and B ≤ ai
zi
wi
,
Ti, if ai ≤ 0 or B ≥ ai
zi
wi
(1 + wiTizi )
2,√
Bzi
aiwi
− ziwi , otherwise.
(16)
where
zi ,
∑
j∈N/{i}
wjdj and ai , ci − p. (17)
5Proof. Take the derivative of UFi with respect to di, we have
∂UFi
∂di
= p+
Bwi
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj(∑
j∈N wjdj
)2 − ci, (18)
• Case 1: p − ci ≥ 0. When p − ci ≥ 0,
∂UFi
∂di
is always
positive, which indicates UFi is monotonically increasing
with di. Thus, UFi attains its maximum when d
∗
i = Ti.
• Case 2: p− ci < 0. When p− ci < 0, let
∂UFi
∂di
∣∣
di=d◦i
= 0,
we have
d◦i =
√
B
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj
wi(ci − p)
−
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj
wi
. (19)
Since
∂2UFi
∂d2i
= −
2Bw2i
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj
(
∑
j∈N wjdj)
3 < 0 , UFi is concave
in di, and it follows that
d∗i =


0, if d◦i ≤ 0,
d◦i , if 0 < d
◦
i < Ti,
Ti, if d
◦
i ≥ Ti.
(20)
Then, let zi ,
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj and ai , ci − p. Theorem 1
follows by combining the results obtained in Case 1 and 2.
Now, we investigate the NE of this subgame. It is observed
from Problem 1 that APs’ strategy set is compact and convex.
The utility of APi is continuous and concave in di, and
continuous in d−i. Thus, according to the debreu-glicksberg-
fan theorem [25], a pure strategy NE exists. However, the sub-
game NE can not be obtained in closed-form due to the high
complexity. Numerically, the subgame NE can be computed
by the simplicial method [27]. The basic idea is to solve the
non-linear equilibrium problem by solving a piecewise linear
approximation of the problem. For the purpose of illustration,
we show the results for the two-AP case here.
Assume c2 > c1, the subgame NE denoted by (d
ne
1 , d
ne
2 )
can be obtained by case-by-case discussion, which is given as
Case I. When p ≥ c2 > c1, the NE is
(dne1 , d
ne
2 ) = (T1, T2). (21)
Case II. When c2 > p ≥ c1, the NE is
(dne1 , d
ne
2 ) =

(T1, 0), if 0 ≤ B <
a2
w2
w1T1,(
T1,
√
Bw1T1
w2a2
−w1T1w2
)
, if a2w1T1w2 ≤B<
a2
T1
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
,
(T1, T2) , if
a2
T1
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
≤ B.
(22)
Case III. When c2 > c1 > p ≥ 0 and a1T1 < a2T2, the NE
is
(dne1 , d
ne
2 ) =

(
Bw1w2a2
(w1a2+w2a1)2
, Bw1w2a1(w1a2+w2a1)2
)
if B ∈ A1,(
T1,
√
Bw1T1
w2a2
− w1T1w2
)
, if B ∈ A2,
(T1, T2) , if B ∈ A3.
(23)
where the regions are defined as: A1 ,
(
0, (w1a2+w2a1)
2
w1w2
T1
a2
)
,
A2 ,
[
(w1a2+w2a1)
2
w1w2
T1
a2
, a2T1
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
)
, and A3 ,[
a2
T1
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
,∞
)
.
Case IV. When c2 > c1 > p ≥ 0 and a1T1 > a2T2, the NE
is
(dne1 , d
ne
2 ) =

(
Bw1w2a2
(w1a2+w2a1)2
, Bw1w2a1(w1a2+w2a1)2
)
if B ∈ A˜1,(√
Bw2T2
w1a1
− w2T2w1 , T2
)
, if B ∈ A˜2,
(T1, T2) , if B ∈ A˜3.
(24)
where the regions are defined as: A˜1 ,
(
0, (w1a2+w2a1)
2
w1w2
T2
a1
)
,
A˜2 ,
[
(w1a2+w2a1)
2
w1w2
T2
a1
, a1T2
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
)
, and A˜3 ,[
a1
T2
(w1T1+w2T2)
2
w1w2
,∞
)
.
From the above results, we can observe that:
• For any given p and B, the NE is unique.
• Different values of p and B result in different NE. This
indicates that the NE is affected by both p and B.
• The order of aiTi has an impact on the NE. The WiFi
AP with lower aiTi is more likely to reach its capacity
limit Ti first.
• All APs will offload at their capacity limits when p ≥
argmaxici.
B. The Optimal Strategy of the MNO
Now, given WiFi AP’s strategies, we derive the optimal
strategy of the MNO. For the MNO, the optimal strategy can
not be obtained in closed-form since there is no explicit ex-
pression of WiFi APs’ strategies. Besides, given the subgame
NE, Problem 2 is not a convex optimization problem. Thus,
convex optimization techniques or existing convex optimizers
can not be applied here.
1) Two-AP Case: For the two-AP case, it is observed from
its subgame NE that: (i) The optimal p∗ is bounded by c2; (ii)
For a given p, Problem 2 is concave in B for each separate
region of B (such as A1, A2, and A3). Thus, the optimal
B for each separate region can be easily obtained using the
convex optimization techniques. Then, the optimal B∗ can be
obtained by comparing the maximum utility function of each
separate region. Thus, the optimal strategy of the MNO for
the two-AP case can be obtained by the following two steps:
Step I. For a given p, compute the optimal B∗.
Step II. Search for the optimal p∗ over the region [0, c2].
2) Multi-AP Case: For the multi-AP case, similar as the
two-AP case, we can show that p∗ is bounded by argmaxici.
This is due to the fact that when p = argmaxici, all APs
will offload at their capacity limits . Thus, using a p larger
than argmaxici will not increase the MNO’s payoff, but will
increase the MNO’s cost. Thus, it is concluded that p∗ is
bounded by argmaxici.
Next, we can further show that B∗ is bounded
by argmaxi
ai
wi
∑
j∈N/i wjTj
(∑
j∈N wjTj
)2
. The proof is
as follows. It is observed from (16) that d∗i =
Ti when B ≥ ai
zi
wi
(1 + wiTizi )
2. Thus, if B =
6argmaxi
ai
wi
∑
j∈N/i wjTj
(∑
j∈N wjTj
)2
, all APs will of-
fload at their capacity limits. Thus, using a larger B
will not increase the MNO’s payoff, but will increase the
MNO’s cost. Thus, it is concluded that p∗ is bounded by
argmaxi
ai
wi
∑
j∈N/i wjTj
(∑
j∈N wjTj
)2
.
Since both p∗ and B∗ are bounded, the MNO’ optimal
strategy can be obtained by performing a two-dimension grid
search over p and B.
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR HOMOGENEOUS APS
In this section, to obtain closed-form solutions and get
useful insights, we assume all the WiFi APs are of the same
type (homogeneous), i.e., wi = w, ci = c, Ti = T, ∀i.
A. Optimal Strategies of WiFi APs
Based on the best response function given in (16), by setting
wi = w, ci = c, Ti = T, ∀i, the NE can be easily computed
as follows.
• When a ≤ 0, the NE is
dnei = T, ∀i. (25)
• When a > 0, the NE is
dnei =
{
B(|N |−1)
a|N |2 , if
B
a <
|N |2T
|N |−1 ,
T, if Ba ≥
|N |2T
|N |−1 ,
(26)
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
It is observed that (i) different values of p and B will result
in different NE; (ii) for given p and B, the NE is unique; (iii)
all the WiFi APs have the same strategy at the NE.
B. The Optimal Strategy of the MNO
Given APs’ strategies, we now study the optimal strategy of
the MNO. To find the optimal strategy of the MNO, we need
to substitute the subgame NE given in (26) into Problem 2.
First, we look at the case that a ≤ 0, i.e., p ≥ c. For this
case, the subgame NE is given by (25). Substitute (25) into
Problem 2, the MNO’s utility maximization problem becomes
max
p,B
λ ln (1 + |N |T )− p|N |T −B, (27)
s.t. p ≥ 0, B ≥ 0. (28)
The optimal solution of this problem is
p∗ = c, B∗ = 0. (29)
This results indicates that p is bounded by c, and the MNO
will never set a p∗ larger than c.
Now, we look at the case that a > 0, i.e., p < c. For this
case, we first present the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For any given p with 0 ≤ p < c, the best
strategy of the MNO is
B∗ =


λ
1+p
|N|−1
a|N|
− 1|N|−1
a|N|
, if U˜L < UˆL,
a|N |2T
|N |−1 , if U˜
L ≥ UˆL.
(30)
where U˜L , λ ln (1 + |N |T ) − p|N |T − a|N |
2T
|N |−1 and Uˆ
L ,
ln
(
λ
p+ a|N||N|−1
)
+ a|N ||N|−1 + p− λ.
Proof. (i). When B < a|N |
2T
|N |−1 , the MNO’s utility can be
written as
max
B≥0
λ ln
(
1 +
B(|N | − 1)
a|N |
)
− p
B(|N | − 1)
a|N |
−B, (31)
It is easy to verify (31) is concave in B by looking at its
second-order derivative. Then, the optimal Bˆ∗ can be obtained
by setting the first-order derivative of (31) to zero, which is
λ
(|N |−1)
a|N |
(|N |−1)
a|N | Bˆ
∗ + 1
− p
(|N | − 1)
a|N |
− 1 = 0, (32)
Then, it follows that
Bˆ∗ =
λ
1 + p |N |−1a|N |
−
1
|N |−1
a|N |
. (33)
and the resultant utility is
UˆL = ln

 λ
p+ a|N ||N|−1

 + a|N |
|N | − 1
+ p− λ. (34)
(ii). When B ≥ a|N |
2T
|N |−1 , it is easy to observe that
B˜∗ =
a|N |2T
|N | − 1
, (35)
and the resultant utility is
U˜L = λ ln (1 + |N |T )− p|N |T −
a|N |2T
|N | − 1
. (36)
Combining (i) and (ii), (30) follows.
It is observed from Theorem 2 that for any given p satisfying
0 ≤ p < c, the optimalB∗ is unique. Besides, as pointed out in
(29), p∗ is bounded by c. Thus, the optimal p∗ can be obtained
by searching over the region [0, c]. Therefore, the Stackelberg
game is solved, and the SE always exists since there exists a
unique subgame NE for any given p and B.
V. THE SALARY-ONLY SCHEME
In this section, we propose a simple incentive mechanism
referred to as salary only scheme. In this scheme, the MNO
motivates WiFi APs to offload data by paying only salary.
Thus, compared with the salary-plus-bonus scheme, there is
no bonus part in this scheme. The game formulation and its
optimal solutions are given in the following two subsections.
A. The Game at WiFi APs:
By removing the bonus part in Problem 1, we can easily
get the problem formulation for the game at WiFi APs under
the salary only scheme, which is
Problem 3:
max
di≥0
pdi − cidi, (37)
s.t. di ≤ Ti, (38)
7To find the optimal strategy of WiFi APs, we first look at
the best response of each WiFi AP given the MNO’s pricing
strategy, i.e., given p.
Problem 3 is easy to solve under a given p, and its optimal
solution is summarized as follows. The best response function
of APi is
d∗i =
{
0, if p < ci,
Ti, if p ≥ ci.
(39)
It is observed that APi’s strategy does not depend on other
APs’ strategy, which means that no non-cooperative game
happens on the APs’ side. Thus, subgame NE analysis is not
necessary for this scheme.
B. The Game at the MNO:
By removing the bonus part in Problem 2, the problem
formulation for the game at the MNO under the salary only
scheme can be easily obtained as
Problem 4:
max
p
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
di(p)
)
− p
∑
i∈N
di(p), (40)
s.t. p ≥ 0. (41)
Given APs’ strategy, we now study the optimal pricing
strategy of the MNO. To find the optimal strategy of the MNO,
we need to substitute APs’ strategy into Problem 4.
For the convenience of expression, we introduce an indicator
function, which is
χi(p) =
{
0, if p < ci,
1, if p ≥ ci.
(42)
Then, the best response of APi in (39) can be rewritten as
d∗i = χi(p)Ti. (43)
Substituting (43) into Problem 4, we have
Problem 4a:
max
p
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
χi(p)Ti
)
− p
∑
i∈N
χi(p)Ti, (44)
s.t. p ≥ 0. (45)
To solve Problem 4a, we first present the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1: The optimal p∗ for Problem 4a can only
take a value from the set {c0, c1, c2, · · · , cN}, where c0 = 0.
Proof. For the convenience of expression, we assume that
c0 < c1 < c2 < · · · < cN .
First, we show that p∗ cannot take any value larger than
cN . This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose p
∗ =
p′, where p′ > cN . Then, the objective function becomes
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N Ti
)
− p′
∑
i∈N Ti, which is smaller than
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N Ti
)
− cN
∑
i∈N Ti. This contradicts with our
presumption that p′ is the optimal solution. Thus, it is con-
cluded that p∗ cannot take any value larger than cN .
Next, we prove that p∗ can not take values between any
two consecutive cost coefficient. This can be proved by con-
tradiction. Suppose p∗ = p′, where ck < p
′ < ck+1. Then, the
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Problem 4a’s objective function
objective function becomes λ ln
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 Ti
)
−p′
∑k
i=1 Ti,
which is smaller than λ ln
(
1 +
∑k
i=1 Ti
)
− ck
∑k
i=1 Ti. This
contradicts with our presumption that p′ is the optimal solu-
tion. The above proof holds for any k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}.
Thus, it is concluded that p∗ cannot take values between any
two consecutive cost coefficient.
Based the results given in Proposition 1, we propose the
following algorithm to solve Problem 4a.
Algorithm 1 Computation of the Optimal Price p∗
1: Sort APs in the following order: c(1) < c(2) < · · · <
c(N);
2: Initiate p∗ = 0 and f∗ = 0;
3: for i = 1; i ≤ |N |; i++ do
4: p = c(i);
5: f(i) = λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N χi(p)Ti
)
− p
∑
i∈N χi(p)Ti;
6: if f(i) > f∗ then
7: f∗ = f(i); and p∗ = c(i);
8: else if f(i) < 0 then
9: Break;
10: end if
11: end for
12: Output: p∗ and f∗.
It is observed that we will stop the algorithm if a ck
results in a negative value for the objective function (Line
8 and 9 in Algorithm 1), any ci larger than ck will not be
considered for the optimal solution. This can be explained
as follows. The function λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N χi(p)Ti
)
is a multi-
step increasing function with respect to p, and it is capped
by λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N Ti
)
. On the other hand, p
∑
i∈N χi(p)Ti
is a piece-wise increasing function with respect to p without a
cap. For the convenience of explanation, we plot out these two
functions in Fig. 2. Thus, after the non-zero intersection, these
two curves diverge, which means the value of the objective
function becomes negative forever. Thus, it is easy to draw
8the conclusion that the optimal p∗ should not lie in the range
after the intersection.
VI. THE BONUS-ONLY SCHEME
In this section, we propose another simple incentive mech-
anism referred to as bonus only scheme. In this scheme, the
MNO motivates WiFi APs to offload data by paying bonus
only. Thus, compared with the salary-plus-bonus scheme, there
is no salary part in this scheme. The game formulation and its
optimal solutions are given in the following two subsections.
A. The Game at WiFi APs:
By removing the salary part in Problem 1, we can easily get
the problem formulation for the game at WiFi APs under the
bonus only scheme. However, the way to solve the problem
is exactly the same as that used to solve Problem 1. Thus,
to make the problem more interesting and mathematically
tractable, we introduce a penalty item λi(di − Ti) to the
objective function to remove the constraint di ≤ Ti, where λi
is the penalty coefficient for APi. Then, the resultant problem
formulation ca be written as follows.
Problem 5:
max
di
widi∑
j∈N wjdj
B − cidi − λi (di − Ti) , (46)
s.t. di ≥ 0. (47)
It can be seen that the penalty item λi(di − Ti) is positive
when di > Ti, which will decrease the value of the objective
function of APi. This indicates the item λi(di − Ti) punish
APi if it offloads more data than Ti. Thus, it can be seen that
the penalty item plays a similar role as the constraint di ≤ Ti.
Both of them encourage APs not to offload more data than Ti.
Now, we show how to solve this problem. The objective
function of Problem 5 is concave in di, and the constraint
is linear. Thus, Problem 5 is a convex optimization problem.
Thus, Problem 5 can be solved in the following way.
First, we take the derivative of UFi with respect to di, which
leads to
∂UFi
∂di
=
Bwi
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj(∑
j∈N wjdj
)2 − (ci + λi) , (48)
Next, we let
∂UFi
∂di
∣∣
di=d◦i
= 0, which leads to
d◦i =
√
B
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj
wi(ci + λi)
−
∑
j∈N/{i} wjdj
wi
. (49)
Then, due to the fact that di ≥ 0, the optimal solution of
Problem 5 can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The best response function of APi is
d∗i =
{
0, if d◦i < 0,
d◦i , if d
◦
i ≥ 0,
(50)
where d◦i is given in (49).
Now, we investigate the NE of this subgame. From the
best response function given in (50), it can be observed that
WiFi APs can be divided into two categories at the NE. One
category of WiFi APs will be inactive, i.e., not participate
in the data offloading. The other category of WiFi APs will
be active, i.e., offloading data at d◦i . For the convenience of
analysis, we use S to denote the set of WiFi APs that are
active at the NE.
Proposition 2: At the NE, there are at least two active
WiFi APs, i.e., |S| ≥ 2.
Proof. Proposition 2 can be proved by contradiction.
First, we suppose |S| = 0 at the NE. This means dnei =
0, ∀i ∈ N , and all APs’ utilities are zero. It is easy to observe
that AP j can increase its utility from zero to a positive value
by unilaterally changing its dnej from 0 to any value in the
range
(
0,
B+λjTj
cj+λj
)
. This contradicts with the NE assumption.
Thus, |S| 6= 0.
Next, we suppose |S| = 1 at the NE. This indicates there
is an active AP at the NE, and we denote that AP by j. Thus,
it follows dnej > 0, and d
ne
i = 0, ∀i ∈ N/{j}. The utility of
j at the NE is UFj = B − cjd
ne
j − λjd
ne
j + λjTj > 0. It is
easy to observe that AP j can increase its utility by unilaterally
changing dnej to a smaller positive value. This contradicts with
the NE assumption. Thus, |S| 6= 1.
Combining the above results, we conclude that |S| ≥ 2, i.e.,
there are at least two active APs at the NE.
Theorem 4: Let S denote the set of WiFi APs that are
active at the NE, the optimal strategy of each AP at the NE
is then given as follows.
dnei =


B(|S|−1)
wi
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
(
1− ci+λiwi
(|S|−1)
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
)
, if i ∈ S,
0, if i /∈ S.
(51)
Proof. From the best response function given in (50) , it is
easy to observe that dnei = 0, ∀i /∈ S.
Now, we look at the APs that are active at the NE. For any
i ∈ S, it follows from (49) that
dnei =
√
B
∑
j∈S/{i} wjd
ne
j
wi(ci + λi)
−
∑
j∈S/{i} wjd
ne
j
wi
, (52)
which be rewritten as
∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j =
√
wiB
∑
j∈S/{i} wjd
ne
j
(ci + λi)
. (53)
Then, it follows
ci + λi
wiB

∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j


2
=
∑
j∈S/{i}
wjd
ne
j . (54)
9For the convenience of expression, we label WiFi APs in S
at the NE as {1, 2, · · · , |S|}. Then, we have
c1 + λ1
w1B

∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j


2
=
∑
j∈S/{1}
wjd
ne
j , (55)
... (56)
c|S| + λ|S|
w|S|B

∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j


2
=
∑
j∈S/{|S|}
wjd
ne
j , (57)
Summing up equations from (55) to (57), we have
(
c1 + λ1
w1
+ · · ·+
c|S| + λ|S|
w|S|
) (∑
j∈S wjd
ne
j
)2
B
= (|S| − 1)
∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j . (58)
Then, it follows ∑
j∈S
wjd
ne
j =
B (|S| − 1)∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
. (59)
Subsitituting (59) into (54), we have
ci + λi
wiB

 B (|S| − 1)∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj


2
=
B (|S| − 1)∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
− wid
ne
i , (60)
which can be rewirtten as
dnei =
B (|S| − 1)
wi
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj

1− ci + λi
wi
(|S| − 1)∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj

 . (61)
This finishes the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 tells us the best strategies of WiFi APs at the
NE, but does not tell us which WiFi APs will be in S. To
find which WiFi APs are active at the NE, we first present the
following propositions.
Proposition 3: A WiFi AP i is active at the NE if and only
if the following condition holds:
ci + λi
wi
<
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
|S| − 1
. (62)
Proof. This proof consists of two parts: the necessity proof
and the sufficiency proof, which are given as follows.
Part I: Necessity. From (50), we know all APs in S must
satisfy dnei > 0. Then, it follows from (51) that
1−
(ci + λi)
wi
(|S| − 1)∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
> 0, ∀i ∈ S, (63)
which can be rewritten as
ci + λi
wi
<
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
|S| − 1
, ∀i ∈ S. (64)
Thus, it is clear that for any AP i that is active at the NE, the
condition given in (62) holds.
Part II: Sufficiency. This part can be proved by contradic-
tion. Suppose that AP i satisfies (62) but is not active at the
NE, i.e., i /∈ S, which means dnei = 0.
Let us look at the derivative of UFi at the NE, which is
∂UFi
∂di
∣∣
di=dnei
=
Bwi
∑
j∈N/{i} wjd
ne
j(∑
j∈N wjd
ne
j
)2 − (ci + λi)
a
=
Bwi
∑
j∈S wjd
ne
j(∑
j∈S wjd
ne
j
)2 − (ci + λi)
=
Bwi∑
j∈S wjd
ne
j
− (ci + λi)
b
=
wi
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
|S| − 1
− (ci + λi) , (65)
where ′′a′′ results from the fact that dnej = 0, ∀j /∈ S, and
′′b′′
results from (59).
Then, it follows
∂UFi
∂di
∣∣
di=dnei
=
1
wi

∑j∈S cj+λjwj
|S| − 1
−
ci + λi
wi

 > 0, (66)
where the inequality results from the presumption that AP i
satisfies (62).
The inequality (66) indicates that AP i can increase it utility
by unilaterally increasing its data offloading amount from
zero. This contradicts with the presumption of NE. Thus, it is
concluded that for any AP i satisfying (62), it must be active
at the NE.
Combine the results obtained in Part I and II, we conclude
that an AP i is active at the NE if and only if ci+λiwi <∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
|S|−1 holds. This proves Proposition 3.
Proposition 4: For any two APs m and n satisfying the
condition cm+λmwm <
cn+λn
wn
, if n is active at the NE, then m
must also be active at the NE.
Proof. This can be proved by contradiction. Let us make the
assumption that m is not active at the NE, which indicates
(62) does not hold for m.
Let R denote the set of APs that are active at the NE except
n, and suppose that n is active at the NE. Then, we have
S = R
⋃
{n}, and it follows from (62) that
cn + λn
wn
<
∑
j∈R
cj+λj
wj
+ cn+λnwn
|S| − 1
, (67)
which can be rewritten as
(|S| − 2)
cn + λn
wn
<
∑
j∈R
cj + λj
wj
. (68)
Since cm+λmwm <
cn+λn
wn
, it follows
(|S| − 2)
cm + λm
wm
<
∑
j∈R
cj + λj
wj
, (69)
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which can be rewritten as
cm + λm
wm
<
∑
j∈R
cj+λj
wj
+ cm+λmwm
|S| − 1
. (70)
According to Proposition X, (70) indicates that m should be
active at the NE. This contradicts with the presumption that
m is not active at the NE.
Thus, it is concluded m must be active at the NE. This
proves Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 tells us that we should always include the AP
with smaller ci+λiwi into S first. Proposition 3 tells us that we
should only include APs satisfying (62) into S. Thus, based
on these results, we summarize the method to compute the
subgame NE in the following table.
Algorithm 2 Computation of the Subgame NE
1: Sort APs in the following order: c1+λ1w1 <
c2+λ2
w2
< · · · <
c|N|+λ|N|
w|N|
;
2: Initiate the set S by letting S = {AP1, AP2} ;
3: Initiate i by setting i = 3;
4: while i ≤ |N | and ci+λiwi <
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
+
ci+λi
wi
|S| do
5: Put APi into S;
6: Update i = i+ 1;
7: end while
8: for i = 1; i ≤ |S|; i ++ do
9: dnei =
B(|S|−1)
wi
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
(
1− ci+λiwi
(|S|−1)
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
)
;
10: end for
11: Set dnei = 0, ∀i ∈ N/S;
12: Output: NE =
(
dne1 , d
ne
2 , · · · , d
ne
|N |
)
.
Remark: It is interesting to observe from Algorithm 2 that
the number of active APs at the NE does not depend on
the amount of bonus. Whether a WiFi AP is active at the
NE only depends on how its cost to quality ratio ( ci+λiwi )
compares with others’. This indicates that the bonus-only
scheme cannot increase the number of WiFi APs participating
in the offloading by increasing the bonus. However, WiFi APs
selected by the bonus-only scheme are premium APs providing
high-quality offloading service at low cost.
B. The Game at the MNO
By removing the salary part in Problem 2, the problem
formulation for the game at the MNO under the bonus only
scheme can be easily obtained as
Problem 6:
max
B
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈N
di(B)
)
−B, (71)
s.t. B ≥ 0. (72)
Given the APs’ strategies, we now study the best strategy
of the MNO. To find the optimal strategy of the MNO, we
need to substitute the subgame NE (i.e. the optimal solution
of Problem 5) into the objective funcion of Problem 6, which
leads to
Problem 6a:
max
B
λ ln
(
1 +
∑
i∈S
HiB
)
−B, (73)
s.t. B ≥ 0. (74)
where Hi ,
|S|−1
wi
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
(
1− (ci+λi)wi
(|S|−1)
∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
)
.
The optimal solution of Problem 6a is given as follows.
Theorem 5: The optimal solution of Problem 6a is
B∗ =
(
λ−
1∑
i∈S Hi
)+
, (75)
where (·)+ denotes max(0, ·).
Proof. The second order derivative of Problem 6a’s objective
function can be obtained as −
λ
∑
i∈S H
2
i
(1+B
∑
i∈S Hi)
2 , which is less
than zero. Thus, it is concluded that Problem 6a’s objective
function is concave in B. Then, its maximum value can be
obtained by setting the first order derivative
λ
∑
i∈S Hi∑
i∈S HiB+1
− 1
to zero, which results in B =
λ
∑
i∈S Hi−1∑
i∈S Hi
. Then, due to the
fact that B ≥ 0, the optimal solution of Problem 6a can be
obtained as B∗ =
(
λ
∑
i∈S Hi−1∑
i∈S Hi
)+
.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical examples are given to investigate
the performance of the proposed incentive mechanisms.
A. Study on the Salary-Plus-Bonus Scheme
1) Subgame NE Analysis: In this numerical example, we
assume that there are three heterogeneous APs in the HetNet.
The simulation parameters are chosen as follows: c1 = 2,
c2 = 3, c3 = 4; T1 = T2 = T3 = 5; w1 = 0.2, w2 = 0.3,
w3 = 0.5. We investigate the subgame equilibrium behavior of
WiFi APs for given p and B. It is observed that for the same p
and B, the AP with lower cost is willing to offload more data.
Increasing the salary rate p is more effective in boosting up
the amount of data offloaded. The AP with lower wi is more
sensitive to the bonus changes. When the bonus increases,
the amount of offloaded data increases faster for the AP with
lower wi. This is because that the bonus distribution not only
depends on di but also depends on wi in the proposed incentive
mechanism. Thus, in order to get the same partition of the
bonus, the AP with lower wi must offload more data than the
AP with higher wi. This also indicates that the proposed bonus
scheme is bias towards to the AP with good quality of service
wi, and thus provides an incentive for APs to improve their
service quality.
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Fig. 3. Subgame nash equilibrium of three heterogeneous WiFi APs under
different bonus B and different salary rate p.
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Fig. 4. Utility of the MNO under the Stackelberg game formulation.
2) The Utility of the MNO: In this numerical example, we
assume that there are two heterogeneous APs existing in the
HetNet. The simulation parameters are given as c1 = 2, c2 =
3, T1 = T2 = 5, w1 = 0.2, w2 = 0.3, λ = 50. It is observed
from Fig. 4 that the utility function of the MNO is neither
convex nor concave in p and B. It is also observed that when
both p and B are large or small, the utility of the MNO is low.
While the MNO’s utility is high when one of them (either p or
B) is large and the other one of them is small. This indicates
that the MNO should in general adopt either the low-salary
high-bonus strategy or the high-salary low-bonus strategy to
achieve high utilities.
B. Comparison Among Three Incentive Mechanisms
For the purpose of comparison, we use the same simulation
setup for three incentive mechanisms. The simulation setup is
as follows. We totally generate 100 WiFi APs. The offloading
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limits of each WiFi AP is uniformly drawn from the range
(0, 5]. The offloading quality of each WiFi AP is uniformly
drawn from the range (0, 1]. For the bonus-only scheme, the
penalty factor λi for each WiFi AP is set equal to the inverse of
its offloading limit Ti. For the purpose of studying the effect of
WiFi APs’ cost on the proposed schemes, we consider two sets
of cost values, i.e. the low cost set and the high cost set. For
the lost cost set, the cost of each WiFi AP is uniformly drawn
from the range (0, 1]. While for the high cost set, the cost of
each WiFi AP is uniformly drawn from the range [1, 10]. The
results given in Fig. 5 ad 6 are obtained by averaging over
1000 simulation runs.
1) Suboptimal Solution for the Salary-Plus-Bonus Scheme:
Though the simplicial method in [27] can be applied to find the
subgame NE, it does not apply to games with large-size. Thus,
for the purpose of performance comparison for a game with
large size, based on the results obtained for the salary-only
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scheme and the bonus-only scheme, we develop a suboptimal
algorithm (Algorithm 3) to quickly find the subgame NE for
the salary-plus-bonus scheme. Substituting the subgame NE
found by Algorithm 3 into the Problem 2, it is easy to show
the problem is concave in B for a given p. Then, under a given
p, the optimal B∗ can be obtained by setting the first order
derivative with respect to B to zero. Then, we do a linear
search for p∗ over the range [c1, cN ].
Algorithm 3 A suboptimal strategy of WiFi APs
1: Sort APs in the following order: c1 < c2 < · · · < cN .
2: Put all APs satisfying ci < p into the set ST .
3: if there is no AP or one AP left (denoted by l) in N then
4: Set dnei = Ti, ∀i ∈ ST ;
5: Set dnel =
√
B
∑
j∈ST
wjTj
alwl
−
∑
j∈ST
wjTj
wl
;
6: else
7: Sort the remaining APs in the following order:
a1
w1
< a2w2 < · · · <
a|N|
w|N|
;
8: Initiate the set S by letting S = {AP1, AP2} ;
9: Initiate i by setting i = 3;
10: while i ≤ |N | and aiwi <
∑
j∈S
aj
wj
+
ai
wi
|S| do
11: Put APi into S;
12: Update i = i+ 1;
13: end while
14: for i = 1; i ≤ |S|; i++ do
15: dnei =
B(|S|−1)
wi
∑
j∈S
aj
wj
(
1− aiwi
(|S|−1)
∑
j∈S
aj
wj
)
;
16: if dnei > Ti then
17: Remove APi from S; and Put APi into ST ;
18: end if
19: end for
20: Set dnei = Ti, ∀i ∈ ST ;
21: Set dnei = 0, ∀i ∈ N/(S
⋃
ST );
22: end if
23: Output:
(
dne1 , d
ne
2 , · · · , d
ne
|N |
)
.
2) The Number of Active WiFi APs: The simulation results
for this example are shown in Fig. 5. Firstly, it is observed that
the number of active WiFi APs increases with the increasing of
the offloading gain coefficient for the salary-only scheme. This
is as expected. A higher offloading gain coefficient means that
the MNO benefits more from offloading data. Thus, the MNO
is more willing to set up a higher salary rate p for the salary-
only scheme. For the salary-only scheme, whether a WiFi AP
will join the offloading only depends on the salary rate p and
its offloading cost c. Thus, for the same set of cost values, a
higher p indicates more WiFi APs will join the offloading.
Secondly, it is interesting to observe that the number active
WiFi APs remains the same for the bonus-only scheme no
matter how the offloading gain coefficient changes. The reason
is as follows. It can be seen from Proposition 3 and Algorithm
2 that whether a WiFi AP is active at the equilibrium or not
only depends on the ci+λiwi <
(∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
+ ci+λiwi
)/
|S|,
which is not related to the offloading gain coefficient.
Thirdly, it is observed the number of active WiFi APs under
the bonus-only scheme is much less than that under the salary-
only scheme. This is due to the following reason. For the
salary-only scheme, a WiFi AP will be admitted into the active
as long as the salary rate p is larger than its offloading cost
c. However, for the bonus-only scheme, only when a AP i
satisfies the condition ci+λiwi <
(∑
j∈S
cj+λj
wj
+ ci+λiwi
)/
|S|,
it will be admitted into the set |S|. Since this condition is more
difficult to satisfy, the number of active APs is much less. The
good side is that it can help the bonus-only scheme select APs
with high offloading quality but low cost (i.e., low ci+λiwi ).
Fourthly, it is observed that the number of active WiFi APs
for the high cost set is lower than that of the low cost set
for the salary-only scheme. However, the number of active
WiFi APs for the high cost set is almost the same as that of
the low cost set for the bonus-only scheme. This is due to
the fact that for the salary-only scheme, the number of active
WiFi APs strongly depends on the cost of the APs. However,
for the bonus-only scheme, the number of active WiFi APs
depends on the ci, λi, wi, and the relationship among APs.
Thus, the effect of APs’ cost on the number of active APs at
the NE is much weaker.
3) The Utility of the MNO: The simulation results for the
comparison of the MNO’s utility under different incentive
mechanisms are shown in Fig. 6. Firstly, it is observed that
the MNO’s utility under the salary-only scheme is higher than
that under the bonus-only scheme. This is because the bonus-
only scheme only is more picky on the WiFi APs. It only
selects APs with high quality to cost ratio. Thus, the number
of APs working for the MNO is much lower, which leads to a
low utility. Secondly, for all three schemes, the MNO’s utility
under the low cost set is larger than that under the high cost
set, and the MNO’s utility increases with the increasing of
the offloading gain coefficient. This is as expected. Look at
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 together, an important finding is that the
salary-plus-bonus scheme can achieve almost the same utility
as the salary-only scheme, using much less number of active
WiFi APs. This indicates that the salary-plus-bonus is more
effective in selecting the good WiFi APs. It not only selects
WiFi APs with high quality to cost ratio, but also selects WiFi
APs with low cost. In this way, it not only guarantees the
offloading quality but also effectively increases the amount of
data offloaded. It inherits the advantages from both schemes
and strikes a well balance between the offloading quality and
the offloading data mount.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a salary-plus-bonus incentive
mechanism to motivate WiFi APs for providing data offloading
service to the MNO in a heterogeneous network. Under the
proposed salary-plus-bonus scheme, we investigated the inter-
actions between WiFi APs and the MNO using the Stackelberg
game. We then studied the formulated Stackelberg game under
two different scenarios: Homogeneous APs and Heterogeneous
APs. For both cases, we derived the best response functions
for WiFi APs (i.e. the optimal amount of data to offload), and
showed that the Nash Equilibrium (NE) always exists for the
subgame. Then, given WiFi APs’ strategies, we investigated
the optimal strategy (i.e. the optimal salary and bonus) for the
MNO to maximize its utility. Closed-form solutions have been
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obtained for the homogeneous case. For the heterogeneous
case, closed-form solutions have been obtained for the two-
AP case. We then proposed two simple incentive mechanisms,
which are the salary-only scheme and the bonus-only scheme.
For both schemes, we developed low-complexity algorithms to
find both WiFi APs’ and the MNO’s optimal strategy. It have
been shown that the salary-only scheme is more effective in
motivating more APs to offload more data, while the bonus-
only scheme is more effective in selecting premium APs which
can provide high-quality offloading service at low cost. Then,
for the purpose of investigating the performance of the salary-
plus-bonus scheme for heterogeneous networks with large-
size, we developed a low-complexity suboptimal algorithm
to quickly find the strategy of APs and the MNO. It have
been shown by simulations that the salary-plus-bonus scheme
can strike a good balance between the offloading quality and
offloaded data volume.
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